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As the decade turns, we reflect on nearly thirty years of successful manipulation of the world’s
public equity markets. This reflection highlights a few of the key enabling ingredients and lessons
learned along the way. A quantitative understanding of market impact and its decay, which we
cover briefly, lets you move long-term market prices to your advantage at acceptable cost. Hiding
your footprints turns out to be less important than moving prices in the direction most people want
them to move. Widespread (if misplaced) trust of market prices – buttressed by overestimates of
the cost of manipulation and underestimates of the benefits to certain market participants – makes
price manipulation a particularly valuable and profitable tool. Of the many recent stories heralding
the dawn of the present golden age of misinformation, the manipulation leading to the remarkable
increase in the market capitalization of the world’s publicly traded companies over the past three
decades is among the best.
Markets are supposed to make sense. When you see
anomalies in the market, it is probably a place where
we should look further.
— United States Securities and Exchange
Commission Chairman Jay Clayton [1]
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I. MARKET MANIPULATION
Today we celebrate three decades of the Strategy [2, 3],
a type of market manipulation employing a specific pat-
tern of round-trip trading to create mark-to-market gains
on a large existing portfolio. The Strategy, shown in car-
toon form in Figure 1 [21] [22], exploits a general feature
of worldwide public equity markets: early in the trading
day (near market open), spreads are wide and depths are
thin; late in the trading day (near market close), spreads
are narrow and depths are thick [4]. An order placed near
market open thus moves the price more than an equally
sized order placed near market close [5] [23] [24].
The Strategy is to accumulate a large portfolio and
then systematically and repeatedly expand it a bit near
market open (when spreads are wide and depths are thin)
and contract it a bit near market close (when spreads are
narrow and depths are thick) [25]. Think of your portfo-
lio breathing, expanding its lungs near market open and
contracting its lungs near market close. On each breath,
the number of shares in equals the number of shares out,
but in units of dollars, your lungs expand just a bit more
when you inhale than when you exhale, leaving the value
of your portfolio (in units of dollars) a bit bigger at the
end of each breath.
If you are a scientist or engineer, think of the market
as a simple mechanical system. Placing an order near
market open perturbs this system. The system then re-
laxes (with part of this relaxation happening quickly and
some of it happening slowly, as discussed further in Sec-
tion II). Placing a similarly-sized order near market close
perturbs the system less. The response of the system to
your perturbations (and the way it subsequently relaxes)
can be modeled and understood the same way you would
model and understand any other system: systematically
perturb it and note what happens. There is no magic
here.
Each of your daily round trips, considered in isolation,
is a money-losing effort. Properly and repeatedly done,
however, your daily round trips push prices in your fa-
vor, causing mark-to-market gains on your large exist-
ing portfolio. The Strategy’s pattern of round-trip trad-
ing – expanding your existing portfolio when your trad-
ing moves prices more, contracting it when your trading
moves prices less, losing money on your round-trip trad-
ing, and posting mark-to-market gains on your large ex-
isting portfolio due to the price impact of your trades –
is market manipulation under any reasonable definition.
Note that the cartoon form of the Strategy drawn in
Figure 1 creates a suspicious return pattern. The in-
traday return (from market open to market close) cor-
responds to the negative return from peak to dip during
each intraday period (marked with a green horizontal bar
along the x-axis). The overnight return (from market
close to the next day’s market open) corresponds to the
positive return from the bottom of each dip to the top
of the peak the next day during each overnight period
(marked with a blue horizontal bar along the x-axis).
Stitching these together day after day, this cartoon view
of the Strategy produces a sequence of positive overnight
returns and negative intraday returns similar to those
seen in the world’s major stock market indices over the
past three decades, as shown in Figures 2 and 3 [26].
The first plot in Figure 2 appeared in Ref. [10] twelve
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The Strategy
overnight
intraday
*(1) Accumulate a large portfolio.
(2) Move prices in your favor.
Toy example: Sell at close. Buy at open. Repeat.
                      Lose on your daily round-trip trading.
                      Win on your mark-to-market gains.
*                      Advanced version:
                          Eliminate the suspicious
 positive overnight returns
 negative intraday returns
                          by buying after (rather than at)
                          market open.
* not shown
FIG. 1: A cartoon view of the Strategy [2, 3]. (Real-life implementation involves more complicated trading in greater volume.)
The black curve shows the cumulative effect of your trading on price. (A long position in a single stock is shown for simplicity.)
Prior to day 0, accumulate a large position in this stock. On day 0 at market close (t ≈ 0.66, at the end of the first green
horizontal bar), sell a small fraction of the shares you hold. This pushes the price down by a bit less than 0.05% (leftmost dip
in black curve). The system quickly starts to relax back to 0. On day 1 at market open (t = 1.0, at the end of the first blue
horizontal bar), buy the same number of shares you just sold. This pushes the price up (leftmost peak in the black curve) by
0.15%. The system again quickly starts to relax back to 0. Sell the same number of shares at market close (t ≈ 1.66), buy
them back at market open on day 2 (t = 2.0), and continue this seemingly pointless daily round-trip trading. If you were to
stop after ten days (don’t), the black curve from day 10 onward shows that some of your price impact sticks around for a while
(as discussed in Section II). Done correctly, your seemingly pointless round-trip trading creates mark-to-market gains on your
large existing portfolio (accumulated before day 0) significantly exceeding the cost of this daily round-trip trading.
years ago. Most of the remaining content of Figures 2
and 3 appeared in Ref. [11] over four years ago.
The obvious, mechanical explanation of the highly sus-
picious return patterns shown in Figures 2 and 3 is some-
one trading in a way that pushes prices up before or
at market open, thus causing the blue curve, and then
trading in a way that pushes prices down between mar-
ket open (not including market open) and market close
(including market close), thus causing the green curve.
The consistency with which this is done points to the
actions of a few quantitative trading firms rather than
the uncoordinated, manual trading of millions of people.
Ref. [10] concluded as much twelve years ago, ending with
the paragraph:
Hopefully, future extensions of our results will
help explain further the sources of the day
and night effect. Potential explanations may
come from an examination of the effects of
the growing and widespread practice of al-
gorithmic trading by hedge funds and other
financial institutions; perhaps price pressure
effects from algorithm generated trading may
account for some of the observed price pat-
terns we document.
The existence of the Strategy explains how such a firm
(with the qualities described in Ref. [3]) can benefit from
this seemingly pointless and costly price pushing. The
literature currently contains zero plausible alternative ex-
planations for these highly suspicious return patterns in
the world’s major stock market indices [27] [28].
The last plot in Figure 3 is a fun variation on the gen-
eral theme in Figures 2 and 3. China is unique in having
a “T+1” trading rule that prohibits your buying a share
of a company and then selling it later the same day [8],
making the “expand your long positions in the morning
and contract them in the afternoon” half of the Strat-
egy explicitly-and-easily-enforceably illegal [29]. China,
which legalized short selling in 2010 [9], is totally fine
with your shorting a share of a company and then buy-
ing it back later the same day, making the “expand your
short positions in the morning and contract them in the
afternoon” half of the Strategy legal (or, equivalently,
not-easily-enforceably illegal). As expected, the pattern
of overnight and intraday returns in China in the last plot
in Figure 3 [30] is consistent with firms executing the not-
explicitly-and-easily-enforceably illegal half of the Strat-
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Overnight and Intraday Returns to Major Stock Market Indices
FIG. 2: Cumulative overnight (blue curve) and intraday (green curve) returns to eight major stock market indices over three
decades. The overnight (blue) curve cumulates returns from market close to the next day’s market open. The intraday (green)
curve cumulates returns from market open to market close. The horizontal axis of each plot extends from January 1, 1990 to
October 31, 2019. The (linear) vertical scale in each plot extends from a return of -100% (bottom of plot) through 0 (explicitly
marked, at left) to the largest cumulative overnight return achieved (top of plot). On each plot, the cumulative overnight and
intraday returns on October 31, 2019 (or the last date available) are explicitly marked, at right. Several curves start on the
first day for which data are available: S&P 500 (1993-01-29), TSX 60 (1999-10-04), FTSE 100 (2001-01-02 to 2018-06-20), CAC
40 (1990-03-01), DAX (1993-12-14), AEX (1992-10-12), and DNB OBX (2009-05-08). The code used to make this figure is
available at Ref. [6]. Data are publicly available from Yahoo! Finance.
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Overnight and Intraday Returns to Major Stock Market Indices (continued)
FIG. 3: Cumulative overnight and intraday returns to eight more major stock market indices, prepared in the same manner
as Figure 2. Several curves start on the first day for which data are available: TA-125 (2007-01-08), ASX 200 (2001-08-27),
NIFTY 50 (2007-09-17), SENSEX (1997-07-01), Straits Times (2008-01-10), and SSE (1997-07-02 to 2017-08-25). SENSEX
prices from the Bombay Stock Exchange (available from 2009 onwards) [7] match those from Yahoo! Finance used for this plot.
China’s return pattern can be understood in terms of China’s “T+1” trading rule (which makes the “expand your longs in the
morning and contract them in the afternoon” half of the Strategy explicitly-and-easily-enforceably illegal [8]) and China’s ban
on short selling before 2010 (making the “expand your shorts in the morning and contract them in the afternoon” half of the
Strategy impossible before 2010) [9].
5egy from 2010 onward.
An earlier caution [3] bears repeating: implementing
the Strategy in a manner creating the highly suspicious
return patterns shown in Figures 2 and 3 is unnecessary.
In Figure 1, move your morning buy from just before
or at market open to just after market open so you do
not leave the glaringly obviously problematic return pat-
terns shown in Figures 2 and 3 [31]. Trading in a way
that leaves Figures 2 and 3 is roughly equivalent to com-
mitting crimes and leaving smoking guns right in front
of police stations in fourteen separate jurisdictions, with
your fingerprints all over the guns. In India, where you
can take the Strategy to a completely different level [32],
you have left a smoking bazooka. Don’t do this. There
are plenty of ways to implement the Strategy without
leaving ridiculous price patterns for anyone to see in data
publicly available from Yahoo! Finance.
Fortunately, human nature being what it is, most are
happy to ignore smoking guns if doing so increases the
balance in their retirement accounts. The disconnect be-
tween this willful blindness and the quote starting this
article is stark.
II. MARKET IMPACT
Market manipulation is similar in nature to other mis-
information campaigns in that effective implementation
is aided by an accurate understanding of the costs and
benefits of actions available to you. With the Strategy,
accurately predicting both costs (losses on your daily
round-trip trading) and benefits (mark-to-market gains
resulting from you pushing prices in your favor) requires
understanding how much the market changes when you
perturb it by submitting an order. The impact your order
has on the market is called “market impact” [33].
When celebrating a technical achievement, it is permis-
sible to indulge in a few details as long as they are kept
short. We permit ourselves a one-paragraph summary of
the existing literature on market impact.
Considering the limit order book of an active market,
define a “fair market price” that probably lies somewhere
between the best bid and best offer. Imagine placing a
single order. Given your knowledge of the current state of
the limit order book, let δ0 denote the fractional change
in fair market price you expect placing your order to have
immediately upon placement [34]. Letting t denote the
time elapsed after the placing of your order and introduc-
ing the parameter s(t) =
√
t for the sole purpose of using
fewer square root signs, Refs. [12–14] imply your price
impact asymptotically decays as s−1. That is, your best
estimate of your order’s initial price impact is (tautolog-
ically) δ0, and the existing literature claims this impact
decays as s−1 for sufficiently large s. Graphing this on a
log-log scale [35], as in Figure 4, the only other point of
interest is the knee, which occurs at s ≈ λ [36].
For the manipulator, the takeaways from the preceding
one-paragraph literature summary and Figure 4 (in light
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FIG. 4: The blue curve shows the price impact δ(s) of a
single order (vertical axis, logarithmic scale) as a function of
s, the square root of the time elapsed after order placement
(horizontal axis, logarithmic scale). The intercept δ(0) is,
tautologically, your best estimate of your order’s initial price
impact, δ0. Refs. [12–14] imply this initial market impact
asymptotically decays as s−1. These two boundary conditions
constrain δ(s) to something like the blue curve shown. The
curve must have a “knee” (power law cutoff), the abscissa of
which we denote by λ. These facts together imply δ(s)
sλ−−−→
δ0λ/s, up to a multiplicative constant of order unity.
of the predictable variation in spreads and depths over
the course of the trading day noted in Section I) are that
(i) you can submit two similarly-sized orders with signifi-
cantly and predictably different price impact by carefully
choosing when you place them (through δ0, and perhaps
also through λ), and (ii) some of your price impact sticks
around a long time, allowing persistent price pushes to
accumulate materially in your favor. These are the fea-
tures of market impact that make the Strategy possible
in practice.
III. HUMAN MANIPULATION
All subjects of celebration have a supporting cast. We
wish to acknowledge two in particular.
First, the academic peer review process has supported
continued use of the Strategy with both false positives
and false negatives. Accepting studies of questionable
accuracy, the peer review system has provided trading
strategies quants have used to construct portfolios. Since
what matters most is accumulating a large portfolio and
then trading at the margin to move prices in your favor
(as shown in Figure 1), the (in)accuracy of the majority
of these studies is not a problem. Constructing signals
from the same pool of academic work has helped align
the portfolios of multiple firms, facilitating constructive
interference in their use of the Strategy. On the flip side,
failure to accept Refs. [10, 11] into the peer-reviewed liter-
6ature has contributed to a surprising but very fortunate
general ignorance regarding the existence of the highly
suspicious return patterns shown in Figures 2 and 3. The
academic peer review process appears to have failed pre-
cisely where it was needed most, and exactly as we might
have hoped and expected given its design.
Second, and more importantly, the successful use of
the Strategy over three decades has required the careful
and thoughtful manipulation of individual people. This
must continue.
The incentives described in Ref. [3] keep those in your
surrounding ecosystem in check and provide near immu-
nity to prosecution as long as your use of the Strategy is
successful, but nothing good lasts forever. Avoiding sub-
sequent prosecution requires your not being among the
topmost decision makers in your firm who are on record
as being aware of your use of the Strategy [37].
If you are already on record as being aware of your
previous or ongoing use of the Strategy, you must com-
municate this fact as a potential problem (clearly and on
the record, multiple times) to the person directly above
you, transferring as much of your personal liability as
possible to him [38].
If you are among the top of the chain of command,
you must ensure none of the people below you put you
clearly on record as being aware of your material use of
the Strategy. Maintaining plausible deniability requires
attentive and dexterous manipulation of the people im-
mediately around you.
Any potential problem is apt to develop along a pre-
dictable path. An underling with overly rigid ethical
sensibilities understanding the materiality of your use of
the Strategy will begin agitating to his peers and man-
ager. Earlier restriction and careful culling of your di-
rect reports will ensure this quant’s manager is not you.
Observing such agitation, you must eliminate this em-
ployee as quickly as possible. Your action, which must be
framed to appear to others as well-reasoned and thought-
fully justified, and in which you will need to involve oth-
ers (including human resources and perhaps other col-
leagues) to diffuse your liability, must be brutal in its
speed and effectiveness. The time elapsed should be days,
not weeks, and certainly not months. Every passing day
potentially adds to the document trail you must ensure
you are not on.
If the problematic employee agitates to colleagues in
other departments (including legal and compliance) or
regulators, they will come to you, and you will be able
to satisfy their concern with some appropriate version
of there being nothing to see here. Penetrating follow-up
questions, the formulation of which requires at least a ba-
sic level of knowledge, will not be forthcoming. Such in-
teractions are problematic in the long term to the extent
they further entangle you in an incriminating document
trail.
IV. HUMAN IMPACT
Three decades of worldwide stock market manipulation
is quite an accomplishment, but it is the wider human
impact explained in Ref. [3] that makes this achievement
particularly special.
The tens of trillions of dollars your use of the Strat-
egy has created out of thin air have mostly gone to the
already-wealthy: company executives and existing share-
holders benefitting directly from rising stock prices; own-
ers of private companies and other assets, including real
estate, whose values tend to rise and fall with the stock
market; and those in the financial industry and elsewhere
with opportunities to “privatize the gains and socialize
the losses,” as those in the business of doing so like to
say. These gains to capital over the last three decades
have contributed directly and significantly to the current
level of wealth inequality in the United States and else-
where [15, 16]. As a general matter, widespread mispric-
ing leads to misallocation of capital and human effort,
and widespread inequality negatively affects our social
structure and the perceived social contract.
The fact that three decades of small price nudges by so
few can have such far-reaching consequences in so many
areas of human life is truly marvelous.
V. BE CAREFUL
There is little more we can do here. You are now fin-
ishing the last of a trilogy of articles [2, 3], written over
as many years, of gradually increasing scope. We have
repeatedly brought this matter to the attention of rele-
vant regulators, both domestic and foreign, and to hun-
dreds of journalists, academics, and other professionals.
None have offered an alternative plausible explanation
for the highly suspicious return patterns shown in Fig-
ures 2 and 3. None have offered evidence disfavoring the
explanation provided in this article. These efforts, spread
over half a decade, have led to a grand total of one-third
of an article written by somebody else [17].
Our younger selves would have been confident that
somebody somewhere was working to fix this [39], and
that there will always be at least a few willing to work
against their immediate self-interest to protect others
from easily avoidable harm. Older and wiser, we are no
longer so sure.
Perhaps somebody else will step up. Perhaps not.
Today we celebrate nearly three decades of worldwide
stock market manipulation. Tomorrow circumstances
may change. At some point hundreds of millions of peo-
ple will realize they have been had. Their anger will be
fully justified. You will not want it directed at you.
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[21] Practical implementation of the Strategy is significantly
more complicated than the cartoon shown in Figure 1.
A sensible risk profile is achieved with a suitably lever-
aged, market-neutral portfolio covering many stocks.
Your trading, perhaps totaling in the ballpark of one per-
cent of total market volume, will be spread throughout
the day, rather than concentrated solely just before and
at market open and market close as shown in Figure 1.
However complex the details of your trading, the impor-
tant component (as far as your profits are concerned) is
the expansion of your existing portfolio when the impact
of your trading on the market is large and the contrac-
tion of your existing portfolio when the impact of your
trading on the market is small. (If you have lots of new
money coming in from outside investors, just expand; no
need to contract.)
[22] The black curve in Figure 1 shows the price change you
expect in this stock due to your trading, averaging over
(ignoring) stochastic variation.
[23] This intraday predictability is a reasonable, perfectly un-
derstandable, and not-intrinsically-problematic feature of
public stock markets. Market makers, not wishing to
be on the wrong side of overnight news they may have
missed, make wider markets early in the trading day. The
market, viewed as an information aggregator, respects
the information content of orders placed near the start
of the trading day more than the information content of
orders placed later in the trading day.
[24] Considering a snapshot in time near market open (and
speaking loosely to help the non-expert build intuition),
“spreads are wide and depths are thin” means there are
few other orders near the fair market price. Considering a
snapshot in time near market close, “spreads are narrow
and depths are thick” means there are many other orders
near the fair market price. You can expect your impact
to be greater when you are one of a few than when you
are one of many.
[25] That such market manipulation is possible is not in ques-
tion. The cost of each round-trip trade depends on how
much you trade, but does not depend on the size of your
existing portfolio. Your mark-to-market gains are propor-
tional to the size of your existing portfolio. Your mark-
to-market gains will therefore exceed the cost of your
round-trip trading as long as your existing portfolio is
sufficiently large. The practical threshold for “sufficiently
large” is in question, but for the world’s stock markets,
roughly one billion dollars of capital (suitably leveraged,
and used to form a market-neutral equity portfolio cov-
ering many stocks) appears sufficient [2].
[26] Most of the plots in Figures 2 and 3 actually underes-
timate the true divergence between overnight and intra-
day returns over the past three decades. Many of the
plots of indices (such as the NASDAQ Composite index)
do not include dividends with reinvestment, the inclu-
sion of which leaves the green (intraday) curve unchanged
and further increases the height of the blue (overnight)
curve. (The most recent mainstream news article we
are aware of covering the first plot in Figure 2 [18] ex-
8cludes dividends, thereby understating overnight returns
by nearly a factor of two.) As a separate matter, correct-
ing stale opening prices in index constituents (see Table
3 of Ref. [11]) further increases the divergence between
the overnight and intraday curves in the plots of indices
shown in Figures 2 and 3, which do not include this cor-
rection.
[27] The attempted explanation we hear most frequently is
that “company news” (particularly quarterly earnings)
is often announced overnight and over the past three
decades this news has generally been good [19]. Sec-
tion 4.1 of Ref. [10] dispensed with this attempted expla-
nation twelve years ago: removing the days correspond-
ing to company earnings announcements does not change
the overnight/intraday split shown in the first plot in
Figure 2 in the slightest. Separately, no analysis whatso-
ever is required to see that the release of company news
overnight does not explain the consistently negative in-
traday returns shown in Figures 2 and 3.
[28] We would obviously be very happy to find that the cause
of the highly suspicious return patterns in Figures 2 and 3
is innocuous. We consider this unlikely, in part because it
would be the first time in the history of financial markets
that highly suspicious return patterns turned out to be
fine.
[29] The Strategy typically involves systematically expanding
and contracting a market-neutral equity portfolio con-
sisting of both long and short positions. In some cases,
including when regulations differ in their treatment of
your long and short positions, it may be convenient to
talk about the expansion and contraction of your long
positions as one “half” of the Strategy, and the expan-
sion and contraction of your short positions as the other
“half” of the Strategy.
[30] We thank Kenan Qiao and Lammertjan Dam, the au-
thors of Ref. [8], for helpful comments and analysis pro-
vided in private correspondence related to the last plot
in Figure 3.
[31] Doing less of your morning expansion before and at mar-
ket open in the United States after Ref. [10] pointed out
the first plot in Figure 2 has reduced the highly suspi-
cious divergence between overnight and intraday returns
in the United States from 2008 onward (a fact more ob-
vious when the top row of Figure 2 is plotted starting
in 2008). This shift in your morning trading, combined
with your regulator’s inability to see how you are trading
without your explicit assistance [20], has facilitated your
continued, unhampered use of the Strategy in the United
States.
[32] The Bombay Stock Exchange provides SENSEX prices
from 2009-01-01 onward [7]. These prices agree (with a
few immaterial exceptions) with the prices provided by
Yahoo! Finance during this time.
[33] The phrase “initial impact” (or “instantaneous impact”)
refers to the immediate impact of your order (at t = 0,
the time your order is placed, before any subsequent re-
laxation). The phrase “impact decay” refers to the mar-
ket subsequently relaxing (during times t > 0). We use
the phrases “market impact” and “price impact” (or in
certain places, to avoid ambiguity, “market impact and
decay”) to refer to a full function of time (defined for
t ≥ 0), encompassing both “initial impact” (at t = 0)
and “impact decay” (during subsequent times t > 0).
[34] For example, if the “fair market price” before your order
is $10.00 and you expect the “fair market price” after
you place your order to be $10.002, then δ0 = 0.0002
(= (10.002− 10.00)/10.00).
[35] In linear scale, the curve in Figure 4 approximates one of
the ten peak-and-decays (starting at market open) shown
in Figure 1.
[36] As far as we know, the correct expression for λ in terms
of other relevant quantities has not yet made its way into
the public domain.
[37] Not to belabor the point, but use of the Strategy is ille-
gal. Losing money on daily round-trip trading in a way
that moves prices to your benefit is market manipula-
tion. Trading in this manner with money from outside
investors without disclosing it is fraud.
[38] Nearly everyone involved here is male.
[39] The correct fix is to understand the cause of the suspi-
cious return patterns in Figures 2 and 3 and to communi-
cate this to the public clearly and transparently, trusting
our free markets to properly incorporate this new infor-
mation. The correct fix is not to pour significant public
resources into hiding the problem, hoping nobody no-
tices. The financial system is largely built on trust, and
trust can be a fragile thing.
